Interbranch Communication and Rule 3.2 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct by McKoski, Raymond J.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2014 
Interbranch Communication and Rule 3.2 of the 2007 ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct 
Raymond J. McKoski 
John Marshall Law School, rmckoski@jmls.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
McKoski, Raymond J., "Interbranch Communication and Rule 3.2 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct" (2014). Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association. 486. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/486 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Footnotes
1. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson
Before the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of
Powers and Judicial Independence, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
69, 80-81 (1996) (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Jus-
tice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 125 (1921)).
2. See Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim, Funding the Peoples’
Right, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 619, 652-53 (2012) (listing
the methods by which the judiciary communicates with the other
branches).
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2(A)(B)(C) (2007).
4. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (1972).
5. Id.
6. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT 75 (1973).
7. Id. at 75-76.
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(1) (1990); see LISA
L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 33
(1992). A few states still retain the 1972 Code provision that
restricts consultations to matters pertaining to the administration
of justice. See, e.g., ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B
(2013).
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(1) (1990).
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1 (2007).
11. Id. R. 3.2 (A).
Judges, legislators, and executives have one thing incommon: they like to talk. Unfortunately, they do nottalk enough to each other. As a result, the branches of
government “move on in proud and silent isolation,” ignor-
ing the nation’s need for interbranch understanding and
cooperation.1
The lack of effective interbranch communication does not
mean that avenues of communication do not exist. The judi-
ciary interacts with the political branches in many ways,
including through judicial-impact statements, state-of-the-
judiciary messages, judicial opinions, service on legislative and
executive commissions, and testifying before—and consulting
with—governmental committees and officials.2
Of course, every aspect of a judge’s conduct, including con-
tacts with members of the other branches, is governed by a
code of judicial conduct based on the 1972, 1990, or 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter “1972 Code,”
“1990 Code,” and “2007 Code”). Each of these codes restricts
a judge’s ability to communicate voluntarily with executive
and legislative officials. 
Rule 3.2 of the 2007 Code provides that unless one of three
exceptions applies, a judge shall not voluntarily appear at a
public hearing or otherwise consult with an executive or leg-
islative body or official. The exceptions permit judges to testify
and consult in connection with (1) matters concerning the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice; (2) matters
about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise while
performing judicial duties; and (3) the legal and economic
interests of the judge or someone represented by the judge in
a fiduciary capacity.3
This article examines the meaning and likely application
of Rule 3.2. We begin with a brief overview of the Canons of
the 1972 and 1990 Codes that served as the precursors of
Rule 3.2.
THE ROAD TO RULE 3.2
Because of a judge’s unique experience in law-related mat-
ters, the 1972 Code authorized judges to testify publically
before a legislative or executive body “on matters concerning
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.”4
Canon 4B of the 1972 Code further authorized private consul-
tations with a legislative or executive body or official “but only
on matters concerning the administration of justice.”5 The
authors of the 1972 Code believed that since judges have a
direct interest in judicial-administration issues like personnel,
budget, and facilities, they should be permitted to discuss those
matters in venues other than public hearings.6 But private con-
sultations on matters concerning the law or the legal system
that did not involve the administration of justice were forbid-
den on the theory that a judge’s views on issues not directly
related to the operation of the courts should be available to lit-
igants and lawyers as well as legislators and executives.7
The 1990 Code abandoned this distinction and authorized a
judge to both testify and privately consult “on matters con-
cerning the law, the legal system or the administration of jus-
tice.”8 Canon 4C(1) of the 1990 Code also permitted a judge to
testify before, or consult with, government officials about mat-
ters “involving the judge or the judge’s interests.”9 This “pro se”
exception certainly made sense.  It is hardly reasonable to
expect a judge to stand idly by while a governmental entity
plans to put an expressway through the judge’s backyard. 
The 2007 Code continues to recognize that a judge’s unique
professional experience should be shared with the other
branches of government.10 Accordingly, Rule 3.2(A) reiterates
the long-standing proposition that a judge may testify or con-
sult regarding matters concerning the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice.11 The 2007 Code, however, nar-
rows the type of personal interest justifying a judge’s commu-
nication with government officials. Canon 4C(1) of the 1990
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12. Id. R. 3.2(C) (emphasis added).
13. Id. The 2007 Code strictly limits the circumstances under which a
judge may serve as a fiduciary. See id. R. 3.8.
14. Id. R. 3.2(B).
15. CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 59 (2009).
16. See id.
17. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 cmt. 3 (2007).
18. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007). Rule 3.2 falls
under Canon 3, which is titled, “A Judge Shall Conduct the
Judge’s Personal and Extrajudicial Activities to Minimize the Risk
of Conflict with the Obligations of Judicial Office.”
19. See id. R. 3.1(A) (prohibiting participation in extrajudicial “activ-
ities that will interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s
judicial duties”).
20. See, e.g., In re DiBasi, Determination (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judi-
cial Conduct Nov. 19, 2001) (disciplining a judge for attending a
college class each weekday from 9:15 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.).
21. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 2 (2007)
(reminding judges to avoid using the prestige of office while tes-
tifying or consulting).
22. Raymond J. McKoski, Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The Give
and Take of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 769, 779-81.
23. See, e.g., JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED: A JUDI-
CIAL INDICTMENT OF WAR ON DRUGS 117 (2001) (quoting Senator
Robert Dole’s call for the impeachment of a federal district court
judge who granted a motion to suppress evidence in a drug pros-
ecution).
24. Id. 
25. Charles Stile, Christie Used Smear to Put Heat on Judges, HERALD
NEWS (West Patterson, N.J.), Oct. 20, 2011, at C1.
26. See Ginger Gibson, If Court Orders School Aid, Christie May Not
Comply, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 22, 2011, at 1.
27. See Brad Cooper, Kansas House Leader Turns Down Chief Justice’s
Request to Address Legislature, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 31, 2012,
available at 2012 WLNR 28186943.
Code had broadly authorized testimony or consultation when-
ever “the judge’s interests” were involved. To avoid the possi-
bility that the judge’s interests could be construed to include
social and political matters, Rule 3.2(C) narrows the pro se
exemption to matters affecting “the judge’s legal or economic
interests.”12 Rule 3.2 expands the pro se exception in one
regard by permitting a judge to testify and consult, not only
regarding his own legal and economic interests, but also the
legal and economic interests of a person or entity the judge
represents in a fiduciary capacity.13
Most significantly, the 2007 Code adds a new exception to
the general rule barring judges from voluntarily providing
information to members of another governmental branch. Rule
3.2(B) permits testimonial and private contacts with executive
and legislative officials regarding matters “about which the
judge acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the
judge’s judicial duties.”14 This exception represents a “signifi-
cant loosening” of the restrictions contained in the 1972 and
1990 Codes.15 Under Rule 3.2(B), the matter about which the
judge acquired knowledge need not have anything to do with
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice and
may relate to social problems and public-policy issues.16
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITING COMMUNICATIONS
WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS
It could be convincingly argued that communicating with
legislators and executives on matters directly affecting the via-
bility of the judicial system, like facilities, staffing, and fund-
ing, is an essential part of the judicial function. Indeed, judges
have an ethical obligation to seek sufficient “court staff . . . and
resources to discharge all adjudicative and administrative
responsibilities.”17 But the 2007 Code classifies all interbranch
communications, regardless of the subject matter, as nonjudi-
cial, “extrajudicial” activities.18 As a result, the restrictions
imposed by Rule 3.2 on testimony before, and consultations
with, legislative and executive officials must be examined
against the justifications for limiting the extrajudicial activities
of judges. Four state interests support restricting a judge’s
extrajudicial activities. 
INTERFERENCE WITH 
JUDICIAL DUTIES
First, personal and extrajudi-
cial endeavors may cause undue
absences from court or otherwise
interfere with the performance of
judicial duties.19 This concern
most often arises in connection
with a judge’s civic, charitable,
and educational activities that
require substantial time away
from court.20 It is less relevant to
the interests served by Rule 3.2
because a judge’s contacts with governmental bodies and offi-
cials usually do not occur with sufficient frequency to com-
promise effective and timely case management.
ABUSING THE PRESTIGE OF JUDICIAL OFFICE
Second, a judge may misuse the prestige of office while
engaging in nonjudicial activities.21 For example, when con-
fronted by a judge soliciting money for a charity, a potential
donor might feel coerced by judicial power and prestige into
responding favorably.22 But the likelihood of judicial prestige
having a bullying effect diminishes greatly when a judge is
speaking with members of a coequal branch of government
rather than with members of the lay public. Indeed, legislators
and executives show little hesitance in ignoring, rebuking, and
criticizing judges. Whether it is calling for a judge’s impeach-
ment,23 claiming that judges “bend the laws to let drug dealers
go free,”24 calling out a judge for crafting a decision to “put
more money in her pocket and the pocket of her cronies,”25
threatening to defy court orders,26 or refusing to let a judge
speak,27 there is little chance of judicial status intimidating
political-branch officials into blindly acceding to a judge’s
request.
PROTECTING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY
A third and especially important basis for limiting a judge’s
personal and extrajudicial activities is to protect the appearance
[T]he restrictions
. . . must be
examined
against the 
justifications for
limiting the
extrajudicial
activities of
judges.
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28. See Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
95-21 (1995) (disallowing membership in a plaintiffs’ bar associ-
ation).
29. Cf. Rising Violent Crime in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 37-39
(2007) (statement of Judge David L. Bell) (outlining the age and
race of juveniles appearing before the court, treatment alterna-
tives, success rates of treatment modalities, and caseloads). 
30. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 13 (2007).
31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989).
32. Id. at 372 (“We also have recognized, however, that the separa-
tion-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in par-
ticular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of
its coordinate Branches.”).
33. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, Project Seeks to
Improve Communications Between Courts and Legislatures, 75 JUDI-
CATURE 45, 45 (1991).
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007); see THODE supra
note 6, at 59.
35. GEYH & HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
36. Cf. California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631
F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An ordinary meaning of the
word consult is to ‘seek information or advice from (someone
with expertise in a particular area)’ or to ‘have discussions or con-
fer with (someone), typically before undertaking a course of
action.’”) (quoting The New Oxford Dictionary 369 (2001)).
of judicial impartiality. Thus, judi-
cial codes prohibit membership in
a prosecutors-only bar association
because it might reasonably call
into question the judge’s impar-
tiality in criminal cases.28 Simi-
larly, testifying at a public hearing
might adversely reflect on a
judge’s neutrality, depending to
some extent on the subject matter
of the presentation but even more
so on the tenor of the presentation. To illustrate the point,
assume that two judges testify before a state legislature in sup-
port of a bill to legalize marijuana. 
The first judge presents her remarks in an aggressive, parti-
san manner blaming Republicans for drug laws designed to
disproportionately impact certain racial and ethnic groups,
resulting in “prisoner-of-war” type incarceration. The judge
promises to “take the next step” if the legislators fail to per-
form their “God given duty.” She also promises to acquit any-
one of a marijuana offense unless the defendant is “proven
guilty beyond any shadow of a shadow of a doubt.”
Also testifying in support of the bill, the second judge
relates her courtroom observations of the racial and ethnic
makeup of persons charged with marijuana offenses, the treat-
ment alternatives available to the court, the advantages of
treatment over incarceration, reoffender rates in her county,
the internal conflicts judges face in imposing mandatory sen-
tences, and how court resources could be devoted to more seri-
ous problems if marijuana were legalized.29 The judge con-
cludes by acknowledging the separate roles of legislators and
judges and reaffirms her commitment to uphold the law, with-
out regard to her personal views.30
Both judges have testified on a controversial issue. The dif-
ference is one of approach. The first judge’s personalization of
the issue and combative tenor casts doubt on her impartiality.
Therefore, her testimony constitutes an impermissible extraju-
dicial activity. The second judge, by maintaining the dignity
and objectivity of the judicial office, basing her testimony on
courtroom observations, and affirming her commitment to fol-
low the law, allows her to advance the same position as the first
judge without casting doubt on her impartiality. Thus, the sec-
ond judge’s testimony is a permitted extrajudicial activity.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Fourth, regulating the nonjudicial activities of judges helps
maintain the institutional independence of the judiciary.
Ensuring judicial independence means “precluding debilitat-
ing entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political
Branches, and prevent[ing] the Judiciary from encroaching
into areas reserved for the other Branches . . . .”31 But while
encroaching on the legislative or executive domain is prohib-
ited, providing assistance to co-branches is not. The separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine does not preclude the judiciary from
providing information, advice, and other nonintrusive forms of
assistance to governmental bodies and officials.32 It is simply
impossible for the legislative and judicial branches not to be
intertwined to some extent since legislatures control court
appropriations, determine court jurisdiction, set judicial
salaries and benefits, and enact statutes governing every aspect
of substantive and procedural law.33
In the final analysis, the separation-of-powers question
becomes: at what point does permissible assistance from the
judiciary turn into a prohibited entanglement? Rule 3.2 pro-
vides a bright-line test. As long as the judge’s communication
falls within one of the categories established by subsection
(A), (B), or (C) of Rule 3.2, no interference with legislative or
executive independence will result. This presumption recog-
nizes the importance of interbranch communication and
acknowledges that supplying information and recommenda-
tions is a far cry from usurping the legislative or executive
function. 
With this background in mind, we can turn to the meaning
and application of Rule 3.2 
RULE 3.2: THE GENERAL PROHIBITION 
Unless one of three exceptions applies, “[a] judge shall not
appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise
consult with, an executive or legislative body or official . . . .”34
Rule 3.2 does not attempt to interfere with a judge’s duty to
appear and testify when officially summoned to do so.35 The
Rule restricts consulting with government officials, but not
every discussion is a consultation. The term “consultation”
implies a fact-gathering purpose related to a pending or
impending matter before the executive or legislative
branch.36 Informal conversations between, for example, a
judge and a state legislator at a Fourth of July picnic con-
cerning issues of the day should not be considered a “con-
[A]t what point
does permissible
assistance from
the judiciary
turn into a 
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entanglement?
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37. Courts and judicial ethics advisory committees have not applied
Rule 3.2 or its predecessor provisions in the 1972 and 1990 Codes
to informal gatherings that include judges and legislative officials.
See ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 347-52 (2011)
(reviewing cases and judicial ethics advisory opinions construing
restrictions on a judge’s ability to testify or consult with govern-
mental officials). 
38. See ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, CRI-
SIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 15 (2011) (highlighting
an Oregon program in which state legislators spend a day observ-
ing court).
39. See Joint Legislative Hearing on the 2012-2013 Judiciary Budget 1
(N.Y. 2012) (remarks of Chief Administrative Judge A. Gail Pru-
denti) (“Over the last two months I’ve tried to contact as many
legislators as possible . . . to better understand their views of the
judiciary, its mission, and its challenges. I very much look forward
to continuing that conversation here today—to working closely
with you and getting to know each of you and learning your par-
ticular concerns.”).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007).
41. See U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 93
(2009) (interpreting the phrase “matters concerning the law” nar-
rowly).
42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
43. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Cod-
ified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 681-82 (2000).
44. McKoski, supra note 22, at 797.
45. THODE, supra note 6, at 77.
46. See, e.g., Funding Crisis Strikes Throughout Federal Courts, Judge
Tells Senate Panel, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS (July 23, 2013), avail-
able at http://news.uscourts.gov/funding-crisis-strikes-through-
out-federal-courts-judge-tells-senate-panel.  
47. Is Congress Listening?, THE THIRD BRANCH (Aug. 2004), available at
http:/ /www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-
28/Is_Congress_Listening.aspx.
48. Id.
49. Letter from Loretta A. Preska to Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Aug. 13,
2013, available at http://www.ndtexblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/chief-judges-letter-to-joseph-biden.pdf.
50. See Keith M. Phaneuf, State Judges Press for Their First Pay
Increase in Six Years, RECORD-JOURNAL (Meriden, Conn.), Nov. 22,
2012, at 5.
51. See, e.g., Guy Clifton, Bill Adds Security in Courts, RENO GAZETTE-
JOURNAL, Feb. 14, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Washoe District
Court Judge Chuck Weller testified in support of a bill to increase
protection for judges, courthouse personnel, and visitors).
52. See, e.g., Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The
Federal Judiciary Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 10-11 (2009) (testimony of federal district
court judge Lawrence J. O’Neill).
53. See, e.g., Anjeanette Damon, Raggio Continues to Push Bill for
Appointed Judges, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Feb. 24, 2009, at A3
(summarizing the testimony of the Nevada Supreme Court Chief
Justice before a state senate committee on the issue of merit selec-
tion).
sultation” under Rule 3.2.37 Neither should the Rule be
implicated when legislators spend a day with judges to
observe court procedures38 or when a chief administrative
judge contacts legislative officials to develop a working rela-
tionship with the legislature.39
EXCEPTION ONE: TESTIFYING OR CONSULTING
ABOUT MATTERS CONCERNING THE LAW, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM, OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Judges may testify and consult about matters “concerning
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.”40
Although some disagreement exists as to the scope of this
phrase,41 on its face the exception covers a lot of ground. As
defined in the 2007 Code, the term “law” includes “court
rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and deci-
sional law.”42 “Legal system” and “administration of justice,”
undefined in the 2007 Code, are comprehensive terms. A legal
system “refers to the nature and content of the law generally,
and the structures and methods whereby it is legislated upon,
adjudicated upon and administered.”43 Equally broad, the
administration of justice “establishes and maintains, and
improves the methods and procedures by which the rights,
duties, and obligations established by the legal system are lit-
igated and adjudicated.”44 Professor E. Wayne Thode recog-
nized the breadth and flexibility of the phrase “the law, the
legal system and the administration of justice” when it was
first introduced in the 1972 Code by noting that it included “a
broad range of organizations and projects . . . corresponding
to the range of concerns that present themselves in the law
under modern conditions.”45
Judges frequently appear
before legislators on an issue at
the heart of the legal system
and the administration of jus-
tice—funding for the courts.
Judges testify before legislative
bodies annually to maintain or
increase a court’s appropria-
tion.46 In addition to providing
testimony, judges consult with
legislators about budgetary
matters. In 2004, the chief
judges of the Eastern, Central,
Northern, and Southern Districts of the California federal dis-
trict court presented a joint letter to California Senators Dianne
Feinstein and Barbara Boxer and each member of the state’s
congressional delegation urging adequate appropriations to
dodge a “perilous situation.”47 In the same year, Alaska federal
district court judges sent a letter to the chair of the Senate
Appropriations Committee warning that “the courts stand on
the brink of a fiscal abyss” and that if funding did not increase,
“it will plunge the courts over the precipice.”48 In 2013, the
chief judges of 87 federal district courts wrote to the ranking
members of Congress expressing concern that “flat funding”
and “sequester cuts” “have created an unprecedented financial
crisis that is adversely affecting all facets of court operations.”49
In the name of the administration of justice and the legal sys-
tem, judges freely lobby legislators and executives concerning
salaries and benefits,50 courthouse facilities and safety,51 addi-
tional judgeships,52 methods of judicial selection,53 judicial
Judges may 
testify and 
consult about
matters 
“concerning the
law, the legal 
system, or the
administration 
of justice.”
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54. See, e.g., An Examination of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Sys-
tem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet of the H.  Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 6-8
(2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hear-
ings/113th/04252013_3/Scirica%2004252013.pdf (testimony of
Judge Anthony J. Scirca, United States Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit).
55. See, e.g., Closing the Justice Gap: Providing Civil Legal Assistance to
Low Income Americans: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 110th Cong. 15-17 (2008) (testimony of Texas state trial
judge Lora Livingston).
56. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 955 (2000) (“Mem-
bers of the [administrative office] staff and federal judges now reg-
ularly appear before Congress to testify on pending legislation.”).
57. Hannah Hoffman, Judge Testifies in Favor of Re-Entry Courts, ORE-
GON STATESMAN JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 2013 (on file with author).
58. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011 (H.R. 2533): Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 30-52 (2011)
(testimony of Frank J. Bailey, Chief Judge of the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Massachusetts).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 2 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Six Years after U.S. v. Booker: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 10-100 (2011) (testi-
mony of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission); see also Gwen Filosa, Judges Criticize Sentencing
Laws: They Tell Lawmakers Rules Clog Prisons, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 21, 2002, at 1 (reporting that seven state
court judges testified before members of the Louisiana legislature
concerning court backlogs, mandatory sentencing, and drug
courts).
61. See, e.g., Ending School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights  of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 71-79 (2012) [hereinafter
School-to-Prison] (testimony of Judge Steven C. Teske).
62. See, e.g., Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Over-
sight of FISA Surveillance Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 2013 WLNR
18825425 (testimony of James G. Carr, Senior United States Dis-
trict Judge, Northern District, Ohio).
63. See, e.g., Drug and Veterans Treatment Courts: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong., 16-18 (2011) (testimony of Judge Jeanne E.
LaFazia).
64. See Aileen B. Flores, El Paso County Judge Veronica Escobar Testi-
fies in DC, Urges Reform, EL PASO TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_22832013/el-paso-
county-judge-veronica-escobar-testifies-washington?IADID=
Search-www.elpasotimes.com-www.elpasotimes.com (reporting
the testimony of Judge Escobar regarding immigration reform).
65. See, e.g., Leading the Fight: The Violence Against Women Office:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 33-39 (2002) (testimony of Judge
Vincent J. Poppiti).
66. See, e.g., Televising the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Oversight of the Courts of the  S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 84-91 (2011) (testimony of Judge Anthony
J. Scirica). 
67. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2(B) (2007); see GEYH &
HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
68. See GEYH & HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
conduct and disability,54 and
access to justice.55
Judges also regularly testify
and consult on matters of law and
legislation.56 In 2013, a federal
judge testified in support of a bill
before the Oregon legislature
authorizing county courts to
supervise inmates released from
the department of corrections.57
Bankruptcy judge Frank J. Bailey
testified before a subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee in
favor of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2011.58
Federal court of appeals judges James L. Oakes and Roger J.
Minor, together with federal district court judge Pierre N.
Leval, testified before Congress regarding a proposed amend-
ment to the fair-use provisions of the Copyright Act.59 Bills
concerning sentencing,60 juvenile delinquency,61 foreign intel-
ligence,62 specialty courts,63 immigration,64 violence against
women,65 and televising court proceedings66 have drawn judi-
cial comment.
EXCEPTION TWO: TESTIMONY AND CONSULTATIONS
BASED ON KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED IN THE PERFOR-
MANCE OF JUDICIAL DUTIES
Court proceedings encompass a wide variety of subjects,
including medicine, gangs, addiction, fetal development, child
rearing, marriage, discrimination, natural resources, pollution,
religion, labor, taxation, elections, and virtually every other
area of human concern. In the course of their duties, judges
frequently gain knowledge in non-law-related subjects that
would be useful to legislators and executives in fashioning
solutions to societal problems. Acknowledging this fact, Rule
3.2(B) of the 2007 Code boldly broadens the scope of infor-
mation that a judge may voluntarily impart to the legislative
and executive branches by authorizing judges to testify and
consult concerning any matter “about which the judge
acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge’s
judicial duties.”67
Three aspects of Rule 3.2(B) are noteworthy. First, the infor-
mation conveyed need not be law-related or concern the
judge’s personal interests. There is no restriction on the subject
of the judge’s communication, and as a result, social issues and
matters of public policy appear to be fair game.68 Second, Rule
3.2 requires only knowledge, not expertise. Third, the infor-
mation conveyed by the judge must have been obtained during
the exercise of adjudicative, administrative, or supervisory
judicial duties. Knowledge developed during nonjudicial activ-
ities cannot be voluntarily conveyed under Rule 3.2(B).
Rule 3.2(B) is tailor-made for judges presiding over drug
courts, mental health courts, veterans’ courts, and other spe-
cialty tribunals. By serving as leaders of the problem-solving
courts’ “therapeutic teams,” judges gain knowledge about
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community problems and solutions to those problems.69 And
there is every reason for judges to share this knowledge with
legislators and executives to assist them in improving the lives
of their constituents.
The testimony of Chief Judge Steve Teske of the Clayton
County, Georgia, Juvenile Court illustrates the valuable infor-
mation that a specialty-court judge can impart.70 In his appear-
ance before Congress in 2012, Judge Teske testified to matters
directly relating to the law, the legal system, and the adminis-
tration of justice when he expressed his frustration with rising
recidivism rates and the need to devote a disproportionate
share of court resources to minor juvenile infractions.71 But
Chief Judge Teske went further, advising the legislators of the
adverse effects of zero-tolerance school policies that came to
his attention as a juvenile court judge. He stated that zero-tol-
erance policies requiring that students be arrested, expelled, or
suspended for minor infractions (1) negatively impact gradua-
tion rates, school safety, and the entire community; (2)
increase juvenile crime; and (3) increase reoffender rates.72 He
further testified that zero-tolerance is contrary to adolescent
cognition, that “school connectedness” protects against delin-
quency, and that “[w]e are a nation in crisis when it comes to
educating our children.”73 Referring to school officials who
promote zero-tolerance, Judge Teske opined: “It confounds the
mind that professionals trained and certified to teach our chil-
dren are duped into believing that suspending a student who
doesn’t want to be in school is an effective tool.”74
Some of Judge Teske’s testimony clearly concerned the law,
the legal system, and the administration of justice and there-
fore was proper under Rule 3.2(A) and the analogous provi-
sions of the 1972 and 1990 Codes.  Less clear, however, is
whether the judge’s comments regarding school officials,
school policies, adolescent cognition, graduation rates, and
school and community safety related to the law, the legal sys-
tem, or the administration of justice. That question, while
determinative of whether a judge’s testimony would be proper
under previous ABA Model Codes, is of no import under Rule
3.2(B), which provides an avenue for the transfer of valuable,
but not necessarily law-related, information from the judiciary
to the other branches of government.75
EXCEPTION THREE: ACTING
PRO SE OR IN A FIDUCIARY
CAPACITY
Canon 4C(1) of the 1990 Code
permitted communication with an
executive or legislative body or
official on any matter involving
“the judge or the judge’s inter-
ests.”76 The Code did not define
“judge’s interests” or otherwise
cabin the apparent all-inclusive scope of the phrase. Permitting
judges to determine for themselves which interests were suffi-
cient to invoke Canon 4C(1) caused some apprehension that
the exception might swallow the rule.77 The disciplinary pro-
ceeding against Arkansas Appellate Court Judge Wendell Grif-
fen highlighted that concern.
Judge Griffen spoke to the Black Caucus of the Arkansas
legislature about funding for the University of Arkansas. He
urged the legislators not to reward the University financially
because of its “practices and policies that exclude, inhibit, and
mistreat black students, faculty, staff, and citizens.”78 The
judge also suggested that the legislature “send them a bud-
getary vote of no confidence concerning sorry leadership about
racial inclusion over the past 130 years at the University of
Arkansas. Show them the money!”79 The Arkansas Discipline
and Disability Commission admonished Judge Griffen for tes-
tifying on a matter not concerning the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice.80 Judge Griffen appealed, claim-
ing that his remarks fell within Canon 4C(1) of the Arkansas
Code of Judicial Conduct, which permitted testimony on mat-
ters involving the “judge or the judge’s interests.” 81
The Arkansas Supreme Court struggled with the scope of the
term “judge’s interests.” It considered whether the phrase
included social and political concerns, or as Judge Griffen
argued, any matter of interest to a particular judge.82 After a futile
attempt to decipher what the ABA meant by a “judge’s interests,”
the court held the phrase unconstitutionally vague and vacated
the disciplinary sanction imposed on Judge Griffen.83
In response to the Griffen decision, the drafters of the 2007
Code narrowed the type of personal interest triggering the pro
se exception.84 Accordingly, Rule 3.2(C) limits a judge’s ability
to testify and consult to matters involving “the judge’s legal or
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economic interests.”85 The Code
does not define the term “legal
interests.” The Code defines
“economic interest” in the con-
text of judicial disqualification86
but not in the context of Rule
3.2(C).87 Comment 3 to Rule 3.2
gives one illustration of an eco-
nomic interest—a zoning pro-
posal that adversely affects the
value of the judge’s real property.88 Neither the Rule nor its
comments provide an example of a judge’s legal interests.
Does Rule 3.2(C) permit the type of remarks concerning
race relations offered by Judge Griffen? Most likely, the drafters
did not intend the Rule to condone commentary on a social or
political matter unless it directly impacted the judge’s financial
position or an interest protected by a state or federal law. At
least one ethics expert opined that Judge Griffen’s remarks
would not find protection under Rule 3.2(C).89 But even
assuming that conclusion is correct, it would not take much to
turn the prohibited social interest in race relations into an eco-
nomic or legal interest. For instance, if the judge’s child
attended the University with tuition assistance from Judge
Griffen, the judge might very well possess an “economic inter-
est” in the payments to the school or a “legal interest” in his
child’s treatment by the institution. Certainly, “[i]t is not a
novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal
interest in the education . . . of their child.”90 Similarly, if the
judge enrolled in a course at the University, a strictly social
interest in the treatment of African-Americans by the adminis-
tration might be transformed into a legal or economic interest.
Moreover, if Judge Griffen had presided over a case involving a
discrimination claim against the University of Arkansas, his
testimony before the state legislators likely would have been
permissible under Rule 3.2(B).
Virtually all states revising their judicial codes since the
issuance of the 2007 Code have adopted the ABA’s recommen-
dation and narrowed the judge’s personal interests to those of
an economic or legal nature.91 Indiana has broadened the
exception slightly by providing that a judge may testify or con-
sult regarding not only his own economic and legal interests
but also those of family members residing with the judge.92
Most notably, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
adopted in 2009 rejects the ABA recommendation to narrow
the pro se exception and retains the language of Canon 4 of the
1990 Code permitting judges to consult and testify on any
matter involving “the judge or the judge’s interests.”93 A few
states fail to provide any pro se exception.94 And most juris-
dictions not yet revising their code of judicial conduct in light
of the 2007 Code include the broad language of the 1990 Code
permitting appearances and consultations on any matter
involving the “judge’s interests.”95
To avoid the need to distinguish between social issues on
the one hand and economic issues on the other, Alaska permits
judges to testify and consult on both economic and social
interests.96 Although the Alaska Code leaves “social interests”
undefined, the term is often used to encompass a virtually lim-
itless array of interests, including “safety, order, and morals;
economic interests; and nonmaterial and political interests.”97
A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RULE 3.2
Assume that a judge assigned to a misdemeanor court
wishes to make a statement during the public-comment por-
tion of a city council meeting.98 After introducing himself as a
resident of the community, the judge plans to voice the opin-
ion that the city should amend its liquor ordinance to reduce
the number of hours that establishments may serve alcohol
from 23 hours per day to 16 hours per day. The judge will
inform the mayor and city council that he (1) is concerned for
the safety of late-night bar patrons and others who may be
harmed by late-night bar patrons; (2) believes that the current
ordinance unnecessarily diverts court resources to deal with
numerous alcohol-related incidents occurring between 2:00
a.m. and 5:00 a.m.; and (3) believes that the current ordinance
fosters a negative community image.
Clearly, Rule 3.2 governs the judge’s remarks since the judge
plans to voluntarily speak at a public hearing conducted by the
city’s legislative body and the city’s top executive official. There-
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fore, the judge’s comments are prohibited unless an exception
contained in subsection (A), (B), or (C) of Rule 3.2 applies.
Most of the judge’s proposed statement appears to be autho-
rized by subsection (A), which permits testimony regarding
“the law” since a city ordinance is a law.99 Indeed, “[t]he plain
language of the [2007] code does not prevent a judge from act-
ing on his or her own initiative with regard to legislative
issues.”100 Rule 3.2(A) also permits judicial input on matters
concerning the administration of justice. And since the admin-
istration of justice includes case management and the use of
judicial facilities, personnel, and funds,101 the judge’s com-
ments about the impact of late-night alcohol consumption on
court resources appears permissible.102 The judge’s concern
about the safety of bar patrons and others might not qualify as
matters of law or court administration but should fall within
Rule 3.2(B)’s window for concerns about public safety devel-
oped by the judge while on the bench.
A more difficult aspect of the proposed statement is the
judge’s view that the ability to purchase alcohol 23 hours a day
fosters a negative community image. An interest in a city’s
image is most probably a personal interest. But is it a legal or
economic interest as required by Rule 3.2(C)?
An argument can be made that the city’s image affects the
judge’s economic interests. A positive or negative reputation
dictates for many communities whether they will attract new
residents and businesses, which in turn impacts property val-
ues, tax revenues, and home resale values. For example, the
city of Winston-Salem considers its image important because:
The image our community has beyond its borders as
a place to live, work and do business influences the deci-
sions of individuals and companies considering to move
to our area. So our image and reputation are very impor-
tant. A community with a positive reputation will have a
competitive advantage in attracting visitors, residents
and business investment.103
Regardless of whether community image suffices as a legal
or economic interest, it is difficult to conclude that the judge’s
comment implicates any policy consideration underlying the
need to restrict a judge’s communications with legislators and
executives. In the context of the judge’s entire statement, the
reference to community image does not misuse judicial pres-
tige, undermine judicial impartiality, or interfere with the inde-
pendence of another branch of government.
CONCLUSION
Judges provide information, unavailable from other sources,
to the political branches. When providing this valuable service,
however, judges must avoid (1) detracting from judicial impar-
tiality in fact or in appearance; (2) misusing judicial prestige;
and (3) interfering with the independence of a co-branch of
government. To help keep testimony and consultations within
ethical constraints, a judge should:
• Clearly state whether the testimony or consultation is
offered in a personal capacity or in an official capacity
as a representative of the judicial branch;
• Present information in an objective, fact-based manner;
• Mention judicial status only when it directly relates to
the manner in which the judge obtained the informa-
tion being conveyed;
• Not mention judicial status when the judge is commu-
nicating about a personal interest;
• Confirm that personal views do not play a role in the
judge’s decision-making process;
• Confirm that the judge will continue to apply the law
without regard to personal opinions or preferences;
• Acknowledge the separate functions of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches;
• Avoid commenting on any pending or impending court
proceeding;104
• Avoid statements that might affect the outcome or
impair the fairness of a pending or impending court
proceeding.105
These cautionary measures will help ensure the free flow of
important information from the judicial branch to the execu-
tive and legislative branches while maintaining judicial inde-
pendence, integrity, and impartiality.
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